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Hospital Quality Improvement: 
Are Peer Review Immunity, Privilege, and 
Confidentiality in the Public Interest? 
Michael D. Benson, MD, FACOG*  
Jordan B. Benson, CPA, JD†  
Mark S. Stein, JD, PhD‡ 
ABSTRACT 
Participants in the hospital peer review process enjoy enormous protections under federal 
and state law. We contend that these protections—immunity, evidentiary privilege, and 
confidentiality—impede quality improvement in health care. As a result of these protections, the 
current peer review system produces both improper severity and improper leniency. We propose 
to reform the system by eliminating all federal and state statutory protections for the peer review 
process. A public process that is open to review and open to challenge by all interested parties 
will better promote health-care quality. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Participants in the hospital peer review process enjoy enormous protections under federal 
and state law. The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) provides 
qualified immunity to hospitals and members of peer review committees for “professional review 
action[s]” that may result in the loss of a doctor’s clinical privileges.1
 
The great majority of states 
have statutes that likewise provide some degree of peer review immunity.2 The great majority of 
states also make peer review proceedings privileged—inadmissible in evidence and protected 
from discovery—and mandate that peer review proceedings be kept confidential. 
In addition to providing immunity to participants in the peer review process, the HCQIA 
established a National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).3
 
Hospitals must report to the NPDB 
when they take certain actions against doctors, such as revoking their clinical privileges.4 
In this article, we argue that the federal and state protections lavished on the peer review 
process are inimical to that process, impede full and effective disclosure to the NPDB, and 
impede quality improvement in health care. The quality assurance function of the peer review 
                                                          
*Clinical Associate Professor, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. 
† LLM (Tax) Student, Northwestern University School of Law, Class of 2015. 
‡ Associate, Cornfield and Feldman, Chicago, IL. 
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012). 
2 See infra Appendix. 
3 See 45 U.S.C. § 11134; 42 U.S.C. § 11133; 42 U.S.C § 11134 (2012).   
4 45 U.S.C. § 11134(a). "The information required to be reported under sections 11131, 11132(a), and 11133 of this 
title shall be reported regularly (but not less often than monthly) and in such form and manner as the Secretary 
prescribes.” 
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system is undermined by two kinds of errors: improper severity and improper leniency.5 
Improper severity occurs when doctors are wrongly disciplined or wrongly denied clinical 
privileges for which they have applied.6 Further, when these improperly severe disciplinary 
measures are reported to the NPDB, such reports can seriously damage a physician’s ability to 
practice medicine, as employers and health insurance companies may be reluctant to hire or 
utilize practitioners with such adverse reports.7 
Improper leniency occurs in a number of ways.8 A peer review committee may wrongly 
exonerate a doctor. A credentialing committee may wrongly allow doctors to obtain or retain 
credentials. A peer review committee may fail to be convened, even in the face of apparent doctor 
misconduct and/or bad patient outcome. And hospitals may evade or violate the NPDB reporting 
requirements. Indeed, according to one study, the only measure that has affected the amount of 
adverse peer review action reporting in a state is the imposition of “a strong penalty for failing to 
report peer review actions.”9 
We contend that the current federal and state regulatory system increases the likelihood 
and frequency of all these errors, both the improperly severe and the improperly lenient. This 
multifaceted focus sets our article apart from previous work that is generally more concerned 
either with problems of improper severity10
 
or with problems of improper leniency.11
 
One major 
element of the current system that predisposes it to error is the use of internal, self-interested 
reviewers. The second element is the array of federal and state legal protections for peer review 
that throw a blanket of secrecy and immunity over the process, preventing scrutiny and thwarting 
legitimate challenges. Putting these elements together, we end up with legal incentives for both 
improper severity and improper leniency. 
In Part I of this Essay, we give an overview of the hospital peer review process and the 
federal and state statutes that protect it. In Part II, we describe the problems of the current peer 
review system, explaining why it tends to produce both improper severity and improper leniency. 
Part II also examines the specific deficits of the current peer review process. In Part III, we propose 
to reform the system by eliminating all federal and state statutory protections for the peer review 
process. A public process that is open to review and open to challenge by all interested parties will 
better promote quality in health care.  
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
Peer review in the hospital setting is the process by which doctors evaluate the 
professional competence and conduct of other doctors, both on an ongoing basis and in the 
context of poor patient outcome. Peer review is widely deemed one of the “pillars of quality 
                                                          
5 See discussion infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
6 See infra Part II.B.1. 
7 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
8 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
9 See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit—Is It Time For a Change?, 25 
AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 47 (1999). 
10 See, e.g., Charles R. Koepke, Physician Peer Review Immunity: Time to Euthanize a Fatally Flawed Policy, 22 
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 10–14 (2009); Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes Have Helped Protect Bad 
Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239, 268–69 (2001). 
11 See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 20.  




Hospitals are required to have a peer review system as a condition of 
participation in Medicare,13
 
and peer review is also a requirement for accreditation by the Joint 
Commission, the organization that accredits hospitals.14 
This article is mainly concerned with peer review addressing the quality of care rendered 
by a specific physician or for a specific patient. In such a proceeding, the members of the peer 
review committee are in most cases doctors who work at the same hospital as the doctor under 
review. External peer review is rare.15  
Moore et al. list the three assumptions underlying the traditional practice of disciplinary 
peer review.16
 
First, “due to their unique and specialized training, only physicians can properly 
evaluate and judge other physicians’ medical practices and detect when colleagues pose a risk to 
patient care.”17
 
Second, “a milieu supporting candid communication is most likely to foster 
recognition of both exemplary and substandard care.”18
 
And third, “peer review participants are 
motivated to maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.”19 
The hospital credentialing process is also a peer review process. Hospitals use the 
credentialing process to determine whether a physician is qualified for employment or clinical 
privileges.20  A doctor cannot provide medical care at a given healthcare facility if he or she lacks 
clinical privileges.21
 
During the credentialing process, the hospital queries the NPDB and makes 
inquiries of various professional sources, seeking information such as the practitioner’s 
“education and training, previous positions held, and malpractice actions and disciplinary 
sanctions.”22  
A.  Federal Regulation Under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) 
The HCQIA provides qualified immunity to health care entities, members of a 
“professional review body,” and associated persons from damages claims arising from a 
                                                          
12 Troyen A. Brennan, Hospital Peer Review and Clinical Privileges Actions: To Report or Not Report, 281 JAMA 
381, 381 (1999).  
13 See 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2014). 
14 Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 20; see Standards FAQ Details: Focused Professional Practice Evaluation, JOINT 
COMMISSION,  
http://www.jointcommission.org/mobile/standards_information/jcfaqdetails.aspx?StandardsFAQId=467&S 
tandardsFAQChapterId=74 (last revised Jan. 31, 2013).  
15 See Marc T. Edwards & Evan M. Benjamin, The Process of Peer Review in U.S. Hospitals, 16 J. CLINICAL 
OUTCOMES MGMT. 461, 463 (2009) (noting that in survey of hospitals, “[e]xternal peer review constituted less than 
1% of total review volume for 87% of hospitals and less than 5% for another 8%”). 
16 See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice Claims Risk, 
59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. We discuss later in the article the extent to which these assumptions are true under the current regulatory 
scheme governing disciplinary peer review. See infra Part II.  
20 Teresa M. Waters et al., The Role of the National Practitioner Data Bank in the Credentialing Process, 21 AM. J. 
MED. QUALITY 30, 31 (2006). 
21 Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where’s of Credentialing and Privileging, The Joint 
Commission Accreditation: Ambulatory Care, available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_where_credentialing_booklet.pdf. See also 
id.; Philip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff Peer Review Law at 
California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 301, 302-303 (2004). 
22 See Waters, supra note 20, at 31–32. 




A “professional review action” is one that is “based on the 
competence or professional conduct of an individual physician” and that may adversely affect 
the physician’s clinical privileges.24 
 HCQIA immunity applies to damages claims arising under state law as well as federal 
law.25 It does not apply to civil rights claims, however.26 Also, it does not bar claims for 
injunctive relief.27 
 In order to be entitled to HCQIA immunity, a “professional review action” must meet a 
number of requirements. It must be taken: 
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health 
care,  
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,  
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician 
involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the 
circumstances, and  
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after 
such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of 
paragraph (3).28 
Congress justified the HCQIA’s grant of immunity to participants in the peer review 
process based on congressional findings that “[t]here is an overriding national need to provide 
incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review”29
 
and that 
the “threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including treble damage 
liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in 
effective professional peer review.”30 
As noted in the Introduction, the other major component of the HCQIA is the 
establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB or “the Data Bank”).31
 
A health 
care entity (such as a hospital) must make a report to the NPDB if it “takes a professional review 
action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer than 30 
days,” if it “accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician . . . while the physician is 
under . . . investigation . . . [for] incompetence or improper professional conduct,” or “in return 
for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding.”32
 
The HCQIA also requires state 
                                                          
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012). 
24 Id. § 11151. 
25 See id. § 11111(a)(1). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. § 11112(a). 
29 Id. § 11101(5). 
30 Id. § 11101(4). 
31 The term “National Practitioner Data Bank” is not actually used in the HCQIA; it is found in the implementing 
regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1–.22 (2015). 
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1) (2012); see also 45 U.S.C. § 11134(a). 
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medical licensing boards to report to the NPDB when they impose sanctions on physicians,33
 
and 
it requires insurance companies to report medical malpractice payments to the NPDB.34 
If a hospital persistently fails to make its required reports to the NPDB, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services can in theory move to revoke its HCQIA immunity for the peer 
review proceedings it conducts.35
 
However, this sanction has never been applied.36 
The HCQIA requires hospitals to query the NPDB when a doctor applies for clinical 
privileges at the hospital and every two years thereafter.37
 
Normally, doctors are re-credentialed, 
or have their clinical privileges reviewed, every two years.38 
To justify the NPDB requirements, the HCQIA contains a Congressional finding that 
“[t]here is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to 
State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent 
performance.”39
 
Prior to the HCQIA, it was common for hospitals to quietly rid themselves of 
incompetent doctors, who then found other positions, sometimes in another state. The HCQIA 
attempted to fix this problem by establishing the NPDB, requiring sanctioning hospitals to report 
adverse actions to the NPDB, and requiring hiring hospitals to query the NPDB before granting 
or renewing clinical privileges.40  
B.  The Varying Levels of State Protection: Immunity, Privilege, and Confidentiality 
Most states provide additional protections to the peer review process that are not 
preempted by the HCQIA.41
 
State statutory protection of peer review comes in three forms: 
immunity, evidentiary privilege, and confidentiality. There are differences in the level and form 
of protection extended. 
Every state but California, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon provides some statutory 
immunity to participants in the peer review process.42
 
Many states provide greater immunity than 
the HCQIA with respect to state-law claims because they do not require the peer review process 
to satisfy all the prerequisites set forth in the HCQIA.43
 
In Illinois, for example, participants in 
the peer review process are immune from damages for all “conduct in connection with their 
duties on such committees, except those involving willful or wanton misconduct.”44 
                                                          
33 See § 11132(a)(1); § 11133(a)(1). 
34 See id. § 11131(a). 
35 See id. § 11133(c)(1). 
36 ALAN LEVINE & SIDNEY WOLFE, PUB. CITIZEN, HOSPITALS DROP THE BALL ON PHYSICIAN OVERSIGHT 8 (2009), 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/18731.pdf; see also Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 37. 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (2012). 
38 Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where’s of Credentialing and Privileging, The Joint 
Commission Accreditation: Ambulatory Care, available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_where_credentialing_booklet.pdf. 
39 Id. § 11101(2). 
40 See supra notes 32–33, 37 and accompanying text. Professor Van Tassel questions how common the “state 
hopping” part of this problem was. See Katharine Van Tassel, Using Clinical Practice Guidelines and Knowledge 
Translation Theory to Cure the Negative Impact of the Hospital Peer Review Hearing System on Healthcare 
Quality, Cost, and Access, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 911, 924 (2013). 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 11115(a) (2012); infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra Appendix. The attached Appendix updates information presented in Scheutzow, supra note 9, at app. A. 
43 See infra Appendix. See also 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).  
44 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/5 (2014). 
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Except for New Jersey, every state and the District of Columbia have some form of 
privilege for the peer review process,45 which means evidence concerning peer review 
proceedings is inadmissible in court and not subject to discovery.
 
There is no analogous federal 
statutory privilege for peer review proceedings. The main significance of the state-level privilege 
statutes is to prevent medical malpractice plaintiffs from using evidence generated by the peer 
review process. 
Finally, all but ten states protect the confidentiality of peer review information.46 
“Confidentiality laws differ from privilege laws in that . . . privilege . . . appl[ies] to [the] 
discoverability and admissibility of evidence as part of a judicial proceeding[, while] 
confidentiality generally applies to the release of peer review information to third parties outside 
of the judicial context.”47
 
“Only a few states[, however,] provide civil or criminal penalties for a 
breach of confidentiality.”48
 
State privilege and confidentiality protections hold even when peer 
review results are reported to the NPDB.49  
III. ORIGIN AND DEFECTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
A.  The Federal and State Legislative Intents Behind Peer Review Protections 
To understand the incentives of hospitals to conduct and report peer review actions, one 
must understand the intent behind peer review’s statutory protections. At the federal level, 
Congress passed the HCQIA in “response to the medical malpractice crisis of its day.”50 At the 
time, there was the perceived threat to “physicians and hospital administrators that they [would] 
be sued” in response to a planned adverse privilege decision,51 and the Subcommittee on Health 
and the Environment even received testimony indicating that the threat of these suits was having 
a “chilling effect” on peer review.52 [H]ospitals and peer review committees were hesitant to 
accuse physicians lest they become the target of retaliatory and costly litigation, and would 
frequently accept “voluntary” resignations to avoid litigation.53 Not only that, but “state medical 
boards would engage in a form of . . . plea bargaining” where they would “accept[] the 
‘voluntary’ surrender of [the] physician’s license” in return for the physician ceasing to practice 
in their state.54  
Congress found that “[t]here is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent 
physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s 
previous damaging or incompetent performance.”55 Hence, the HCQIA requires hospitals to 
                                                          
45 See infra Appendix. 
46 These states do not address the issue of confidentiality: Arkansas, California, Florida, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Jersey, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin. See infra Appendix. 
47 Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 17. 
48 Id. at 35–36. 
49 GERALD N. ROGAN ET AL., HOW PEER REVIEW FAILED AT REDDING MEDICAL CENTER, WHY IT IS FAILING 
ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 30 (2008), available at 
http://roganconsulting.com/docs/Congressional_Report-Disaster_Analysis_RMC_6-1-08.pdf (referring to the NPDB 
as “the Data Bank”). 




54 Id. at 5–6. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (2012). 
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report physicians to the NPDB under certain circumstances, chiefly in the event of an adverse 
peer review outcome.56 Next, the HCQIA grants those who participate in the peer review process 
immunity from damages provided that an action is taken:  
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health 
care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts . . . , (3) after adequate notice 
and hearing are afforded to the physician involved . . . , and (4) in the reasonable 
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known . . . .57  
 
The HCQIA’s legislative history indicates that Congress believed limited immunity was essential 
to ensure both that physicians would participate in peer review and that hospitals would report 
errant physicians to the NPDB.58   
The HCQIA sought to encourage doctors to perform peer review by protecting 
them from suits by disciplined physicians and treble antitrust damages.59 This reasoning 
is not far removed from state peer review protection statutes, which have a variety of 
similar rationales. The predominant rationale for state protections is the belief that 
doctors are the most familiar with the relevant standard of care, and hence are best able to 
judge their fellow physicians, but the fear of litigation discourages them from 
participating.60 Therefore, physicians and legislatures conclude, the best way to 
encourage peer review is to provide greater protection for it.61 
                                                          
56 The HCQIA provides in pertinent part:  
Each health care entity which— 
 (A) takes a professional review action that adversely affects the clinical privileges of a 
physician for a period longer than 30 days;  
 (B) accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician—  
 (i) while the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible 
incompetence or improper professional conduct, or  
 (ii) in return for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding; or  
 (C) in the case of such an entity which is a professional society, takes a professional review 
action which adversely affects the membership of a physician in the society, 
 shall report to the Board of Medical Examiners. 
Id. § 11133(a)(1). “The term ‘adversely affecting’ includes reducing, restricting, suspending, revoking, denying, or 
failing to renew clinical privileges or membership in a health care entity.” Id. § 11151(1). 
57 Id. § 11112(a). For participating in the peer review process, the HCQIA protects  
(A) the professional review body, (B) any person acting as a member or staff to the body, (C) any 
person under a contract or other formal agreement with the body, and (D) any person who 
participates with or assists the body with respect to the action . . . [from liability for] damages 
under any law of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to 
the action.   
Id. § 11111(a)(1). This also applies to individuals providing information to the peer review body.  See id. 
§ 11111(a)(2).  
58 H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 3 (1986). 
59 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012). 
60 See Leigh Ann Lauth, Note, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: An Invitation for Sham 
Peer Review in the Health Care Setting, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 151, 167 (2007). 
61 See Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 17. 
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Another postulated rationale is to allow an “institution to learn from its mistakes and . . . 
make amends with [the] affected parties, which may . . . curb litigation.”62 The ideal outcome 
would be for doctors to self-report mistakes to the peer review committee.63 Self-reporting would 
“allow the peer review committee to investigate the situation, attempt to settle grievances with 
the patient, and provide education to other health care providers in order to reduce the occurrence 
of such mistakes in the future.”64 This enables the doctor to self-report without the “fear that this 
information will be used by the hospital or the patient against him.”65  
B.  Defects of the Current System 
The immunity granted to the peer review process by the Healthcare Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986, together with state protections of immunity, privilege, and 
confidentiality, have the paradoxical effect of undermining the quality assurance function of peer 
review. These protections produce both improper severity and improper leniency.  
I. Improper Severity 
One serious problem of the current system is bad-faith, or “sham,” peer review. Sham 
peer review occurs when a physician is disciplined not because of an honest determination as to 
his competence or conduct, but for some other improper motive. Evidence of this problem, 
indeed, may have been present at the birth of the HCQIA. In enacting the HCQIA, Congress was 
influenced by the Supreme Court’s holding in Patrick v. Burget.66
 
In Patrick, a doctor, Timothy 
Patrick, had left a medical practice in Astoria, Oregon, and had become a competitor of the 
doctors in that practice.67 Patrick’s competitors then initiated peer review proceedings against 
him, and may have been able to control those proceedings.68 Rather than have his hospital 
privileges revoked, Patrick resigned from the hospital with which he and his competitors were 
affiliated.69 He then sued for antitrust violations and recovered treble damages.70  
One conclusion observers might have drawn from Patrick is that the peer review process, 
where competitors serve as both prosecutors and judges, is susceptible to considerable abuse, and 
that legal remedies must be available to deter such abuse. Instead, in a triumph of public relations 
for the hospital industry, Congress concluded that the entire institution of peer review was 
jeopardized by suits like that in Patrick, saying “[t]he threat of private money damage liability 
under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably 
discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.”71 
The HCQIA provides that in order to qualify for immunity, a peer review proceeding 
cannot use reviewers who are “in direct economic competition with the physician involved.”72
 
The sham peer review that may have occurred in the Patrick case, therefore, presumably would 
                                                          
62 Lauth, supra note 60, at 166. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 486 U.S. 94 (1988); see generally Van Tassel, supra note 40, at 919–21 (giving an excellent summary of Patrick 
and discussing congressional response to it). 
67 See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 96. 
68 See id. at 97.  
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 97–98. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (2012). 
72 Id. at § 11112 (b)(3)(A)(iii). 
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not be protected today under the HCQIA. Nevertheless, it is not always clear when a peer 
reviewer can be characterized as a direct economic competitor of the physician under review.73
 
Direct competitors also can have influence on the peer review process even when they do not 
serve as reviewers themselves, such as where hospital bylaws prevent direct competitors from 
participating in a review committee or a fair hearing panel, but do not prohibit them from 
participating in the peer review process in a different capacity.74  
Since the adoption of the HCQIA, a considerable body of evidence has grown appearing 
to demonstrate that the current federal-state regulatory scheme shields the peer review process 
from challenge and scrutiny.75
 
Some care is needed when evaluating this evidence. There are two 
sides to every case, and public accusations of sham review are often accompanied by no 
comment from the hospital, or only the most vague and anodyne denial. Still, we are convinced, 
from reviewing the various reports and from our own anecdotal experience, that sham peer 
review is indeed a serious problem. Simple common sense dictates that if people have the motive 
and ability to get rid of an unwanted coworker for illegitimate reasons, with little expectation of 
being called to account, they will sometimes do so. Perhaps a worse indictment of the current 
peer review process is that there is simply no way to assess the validity of peer review either for 
individual cases or institution-wide. 
The desire to eliminate competitors is not the only improper motive that figures in sham 
peer review. The accused doctor may be the victim of a personality conflict. The internal 
reviewers may be acceding to the will of hospital administrators, who have their own improper 
motives. Most troubling of all, the hospital administrators and/or internal reviewers may desire to 
rid themselves of a whistleblower. 
There are many reported examples of hospitals using disciplinary peer review, or the 
threat of peer review, to retaliate against doctors who raise questions about health care quality. 
As stated in one journalistic account: “In medical centers as small as Centre Community Hospital 
in State College [Pennsylvania] and as prestigious as Yale and Cornell, doctors who step forward 
to warn of unsafe conditions or a colleague’s poor work say they have been targeted by hospital 
administrations or boards.”76
 
The wide perception among doctors that whistleblowers may be 
punished with sham peer review has, of course, an in terrorem effect, discouraging doctors from 
challenging hospital administrators on issues of health care quality. Ironically, fear of sham peer 
review or other discipline leads doctors to avoid criticizing the work of colleagues when they 
believe such criticism may be unwelcome to hospital administrators: precisely the opposite of the 
hoped-for effect of HCQIA immunity. 
When a doctor is wrongfully deprived of hospital privileges, there is enormous social 
waste. If the loss of privileges is for more than thirty days, the adverse action must be reported to 
                                                          
73 See, e.g., Pierson v. Orlando Health, No. 6:08-cv-466-JA-GJK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115101, at  *42–46 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 27, 2010). 
74 Such as being a witness for the hospital, “participat[ing] in the board meetings regarding the adverse action 
against” a doctor, “participat[ing] in the board meetings during which [a doctor]’s peer review was discussed,” or 
“present[ing] the executive committee's case before [a] review committee [or] the fair hearing panel.” Doe v. Delnor 
Cmty. Health Sys., No. 2-10-0880, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2418, at *43 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011).  
75 See, e.g., Koepke, supra note 10, at 6–8; William M. Johnston, Shammed I Am, in Peer Review: Due Process 
Does Not Apply for Physicians Facing Sham Peer Review, GEN. SURGERY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2004), 
http://www.generalsurgerynews.com/Opinions-Letters/Article/08-04/Shammed-I-Am-in-Peer-Review/3894. 
Additional examples are cited in Van Tassel, supra note 40, at 954–55. 
76 Steve Twedt, The Cost of Courage: How the Tables Turn on Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2003, 
at A1. 




Often, such a report seriously damages a doctor’s career, as hospital employers and 
health insurance companies are reluctant to have the doctor serve as a preferred provider within 
their insurance networks. 
To be sure, doctors who are victims of sham peer review do, in theory, have a legal 
remedy. Congress provided only qualified immunity to the peer review process, not absolute 
immunity. The immunity can be overcome, and a federal civil suit for damages can be 
maintained, if the disciplined doctor can show that the discipline was not taken “in the 
reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,” or that one of the 
other prerequisites of the HCQIA was not met.78
 
Some suits alleging sham peer review have 
been successful even in the face of federal and state immunities. Nevertheless, these suits are 
now severely hampered, and often courts give enormous deference to the peer review process—
possibly more deference than the immunity statutes intend.79
 
In fact, out of 133 challenges to 
immunity under HCQIA by 2011, only seventeen (12.8%) were successful in vacating 
immunity.80  
II. Improper Leniency 
i. Peer Review Committees that are Biased in Favor of the Accused Doctor or not 
Convened at all 
Just as improper motivations protected by immunity and secrecy can lead hospitals and 
self-interested reviewers to mete out unjustified punishment, these factors can also lead hospitals 
and self-interested reviewers to withhold justified punishment and whitewash a doctor’s 
misconduct. Improper motives for leniency can include personal friendships and collaborative 
relationships with the accused doctor. Physician reviewers not in the same specialty as the doctor 
under review may lose patient referrals from that doctor.81
 
Physicians in the same specialty may 
also have collaborative relationships; for example, they may cross-cover for the accused doctor 
to maintain hospital on-call coverage.82 Once again, internal reviewers may simply accede to the 
will of hospital administrators who have their own improper motivations, this time in favor of the 
accused doctor. 
Peer review bodies that are disposed to improper leniency are in a way more insidious 
than those that are disposed to improper severity. At least in the event of sham peer review, there 
is one party—the doctor under review—who has some idea what has occurred and may be 
motivated to contest the result. When a peer review body improperly exonerates the doctor, no 
one may be aware that something is amiss because the process is shrouded in secrecy.  
                                                          
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
78 See id. § 11112(a). 
79 See Eleanor D. Kinney, Hospital Peer Review of Physicians: Does Statutory Immunity Increase Risk of 
Unwarranted Professional Injury?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57, 67–68 (2009). 
80 Susan Lapenta, J.D., Horty, Spinger, and Mattern P.C., Peer Review Protections: Lessons Learned from Battles 
Lost Presentation at the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Quality and Safety for Leaders in 
Women’s Health Care course (June 9-11, 2011).  
81 See ROGAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 30; see also Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
82 Telephone Interview with Michael Benson, Clinical Assoc. Professor, Nw. Univ. Feinberg Sch. of Med. (Feb. 16, 
2012) (“Virtually all medical specialties that involve some sort of hospital presence require continuous 24/7 
emergency availability, or on-call coverage.”) This is a vital function of most specialties of medical practice.  
Physicians often cross-cover for each other across employment boundaries (i.e., the hospital-employed vs. private 
practice divide or among different private practice groups). Id. 
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Because of the shroud of secrecy, it is impossible to prove how frequently such cases 
occur, but one indication of the danger can be seen in the dramatic failure of peer review in the 
Redding Medical Center scandal. At Redding Medical Center in Redding, California, two 
cardiac specialists, Drs. Moon and Realyvasquez, conspired to perform an enormous number of 
unnecessary heart surgeries between 1992 and 2002.83 Moon, the director of cardiology, 
intentionally misdiagnosed patients as needing complicated surgery and referred them to 
Realyvasquez, the director of cardiac surgery.84 As a result, patients died, but the two doctors 
were enriched, as was Redding Medical Center.85 The hospital administrators, along with Moon 
and Realyvasquez, blocked peer review of the unnecessary surgeries, even though other doctors 
at Redding raised alarms.86
 
If peer review were a public process, it would be difficult to get away 
with such a scheme, but due to the web of federal and state protections, no one knows what 
happens in the peer review process—and no one can find out. 
ii. Thwarting the Negligent Credentialing Tort 
Tort law provides one avenue that can potentially discourage hospitals from refusing to 
conduct necessary peer review, or from whitewashing a doctor’s errors in a peer review 
proceeding that is biased in favor of the accused doctor. Many states allow a tort action for 
negligent credentialing.87
 
In those states, a doctor’s hospital privileges must be authorized and 
periodically reauthorized by credentialing committees.88 If a doctor commits malpractice, the 
injured plaintiff can attempt to sue not only the doctor, but also the hospital under a number of 
theories. One of those theories is that the hospital negligently granted or extended hospital 
privileges to the doctor.89 Such an action might also challenge the failure of the hospital to 
institute peer review of the doctor’s past mistakes or claim that a peer review proceeding was 
biased in favor of the doctor.90 
However, the very state statutes that protect the peer review process from claims by 
doctors that it was too harsh have also been used, at times, to defeat negligent credentialing 
actions alleging improper leniency. For example, in Tennessee and Colorado, appellate courts 
have decided that state peer review statutes barred claims for damages for negligent 
credentialing.91 
It is even arguable that the HCQIA bars every negligent credentialing action, in every 
state.92 The HCQIA extends its protection to “a professional review action . . . of a professional 
                                                          
83 ROGAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. 
84 See id. at 8–9. 
85 See id. at 7–9. 
86 Id. at 8–9.  
87 See, e.g., Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 313 (Minn. 2007). 
88 Ambulatory Care Program: The Who, What, When, and Where’s of Credentialing and Privileging, The Joint 
Commission Accreditation: Ambulatory Care, available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/AHC_who_what_when_and_where_credentialing_booklet.pdf. 
89 The plaintiffs bar already brings actions for negligent credentialing on behalf of patients. See, e.g., Richard L. 
Griffith & Jordan M. Parker, With Malice Toward None: The Metamorphosis of Statutory and Common Law 
Protections for Physicians and Hospitals in Negligent Credentialing Litigation, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 157, 161–65 
(1991). 
90 See generally Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
91 See Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 817 (Colo. App. 2007); Smith v. Pratt, No. M2008-01540-
COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 1086953, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2009). 
92 See Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 23–25. 
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review body” which meets the various requirements of the statute.93 A credentialing committee 
would fit within this definition as well as a disciplinary peer review committee. The HCQIA 
does have a provision stating that it shall not be “construed as affecting in any manner the rights 
and remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to seek redress for 
any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or care by any physician, health 
care practitioner, or health care entity.”94 However, it is unclear whether a negligent credentialing 
claim is a claim seeking redress for “any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent 
treatment or care.” Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has suggested, in dicta, that a negligent 
credentialing claim is not a claim of negligent treatment and therefore might be barred by the 
HCQIA.95 
Even if the federal HCQIA is not interpreted to bar negligent credentialing claims, some 
state peer review statutes have been so interpreted. By removing the threat of these tort claims, 
courts have removed a major incentive for hospitals to avoid improper leniency.  
iii. Underreporting to the NPDB 
Perhaps the most striking irony of the web of protections that surrounds the peer review 
system is that it undermines the NPDB reporting system contained in the HCQIA. The NPDB 
reporting system is widely viewed as deficient, with substantial and perhaps massive 
underreporting of actions by hospitals against doctors affecting their clinical privileges.96
 
A 2009 
report by Public Citizen, titled Hospitals Drop the Ball on Physician Oversight,
 
lays out some of 
the dimensions of the problem.97 Before the HCQIA took effect, it was estimated that 5,000 to 
10,000 hospital adverse actions per year would be reported to the NPDB.98
 
However, between 
the years 1990 and 2007, an average of only 650 reportable incidents were submitted per year, 
and the number of adverse actions reported per year has been trending down over time.99
 
As of 
December 31, 2007, forty-nine percent of U.S.-NPDB registered hospitals (2,845 out of 5,823) 
“had never reported a clinical privilege sanction to the NPDB.”100 
There are ways to get around reporting peer review actions to the NPDB. In an attempt to 
understand the variation in state reporting, the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) funded a study in 1994 of 144 rural hospitals in the Pacific Northwest region.101 In that 
study, approximately one-fifth of the hospitals increased activities that would enable them to 
avoid reporting to the NPDB, such as increased monitoring without restricting clinical privileges, 
requiring continuing medical education in lieu of restricting privileges, “having physicians resign 
or voluntarily surrender clinical privileges . . . , and imposing disciplinary periods [of shorter] 
than [thirty-one] days.”102
 
Of these various measures, only one formally violates the HCQIA: 
                                                          
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (2012). 
94 Id. § 11115(d). 
95 See St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. 1997). 
96 See, e.g., Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Hospital Peer Review and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Clinical 
Privileges Action Reports, 281 JAMA 349, 350–51 (1999); see also LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 36, at 2–3; 
Waters et al., supra note 20, at 36. 
97 See LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 36, at 5–9. 
98 Id. at 5. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 9. 
101 Id. at 16. 
102 Id. at 16; see also William E. Neighbor et al., Rural Hospitals’ Experience with the National Practitioner Data 
Bank, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 663, 665 (1997). 
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having physicians resign or voluntarily surrender clinical privileges under threat of peer review, 
without reporting this action.103
 
However, it is a violation that is unlikely to be detected, due to 
the secrecy that surrounds the peer review process. 
Underreporting by hospitals to the NPDB is a problem of incentives. First, there is no 
effective sanction for underreporting at the federal level. Through a laborious process, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to revoke the HCQIA immunity of 
hospitals that engage in a pattern of non-reporting, but this sanction has never been imposed.104 
Public Citizen urges that the HCQIA be amended to allow the imposition of civil fines for each 
failure of a health care entity “to report an adverse action to the [NPDB].”105 
We agree with this recommendation.106
 
We contend, however, that the major incentive 
for underreporting is the shroud of secrecy and immunity surrounding the peer review process, 
which makes it too easy for hospitals to violate their reporting obligations without detection. 
Others share this concern, though they may make the point in a more understated way. For 
example, in a 2006 article, Waters et al. state: 
[T]he inability of regulatory authorities to police reporting permits and may even 
facilitate institutional failure to report these reportable actions. Regulatory agencies 
generally do not have easy access to the universe of peer review and disciplinary 
actions by institutions to compare with those that are reported because such actions 
are considered confidential and shielded by many state statutes. While such 
restrictions are often cited as necessary to protect patient confidentiality and 
practitioner reputation, they make it extremely difficult to hold institutions 
accountable for meeting reporting requirements.107  
In 2002, as described in the Public Citizen report, a failed study attempted to gauge 
hospitals’ and HMOs’ compliance with their NPDB reporting obligations.108 Even though the 
health organizations selected to participate in the study were offered amnesty for violations and 
other incentives, they still refused to participate, unwilling to disclose their peer review 
records.109 The study was thus abandoned.110 
This abandoned study was initiated by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) on behalf of the 
Health Resources and Services Administration.111 In its report, PwC recommended that “HRSA . 
. . seek legislative authority and funding for conducting compliance reviews of clinical privilege 
reporting, including authority to access peer review records.”112 
Although we are convinced that the secrecy surrounding the peer review process is the 
main impediment to fuller compliance by hospitals with their reporting obligations, this is once 
again hard to prove. A great deal of useful information about NPDB reporting can be gleaned 
                                                          
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
104 LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 36, at 8. 
105 Id. at 32. 
106 Other commentators also propose giving regulatory authorities greater flexibility to sanction hospitals. See, e.g., 
ROGAN ET AL., supra note 49, at 31–32; Kinney, supra note 79, at 84. 
107 Waters et al., supra note 20, at 38. 
108 See LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 36, at 28. 
109 See id. at 28–29. 
110 Id. at 29. 
111 Id. at 28. 
112 Id. at 29. Public Citizen supported this recommendation. Id. at 32. 
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from the University of Washington (UW) study presented by Scheutzow, concerning the effect 
of state laws on NPDB reporting.113
 
The UW study found that—controlling for various factors 
that might influence reporting of adverse events to the NPDB—the strength of state immunity 
and privilege statutes had an unexpected negative effect on reporting: states with stronger 
protection for the peer review process had less reporting.114
 
Confidentiality laws, the study 
found, had no effect on reporting.115 
The UW study did find that the three states that imposed substantial penalties for failure 
to report adverse events to the state licensing board (events that would also have to be reported to 
the NPDB) had increased reporting to the NPDB.116
 
This finding underlines the fact that 
hospitals now have insufficient incentive to report adverse events to the NPDB. As deterrence is 
a function both of the strength of the penalty and the likelihood of getting caught, we believe the 
finding of increased NPDB compliance in high-penalty states supports our argument that making 
it harder for hospitals to hide their peer review activities would increase adverse event reporting. 
The finding of increased NPDB compliance in high-penalty states also supports the proposal—
advanced by Public Citizen and other commentators—that additional non-reporting penalties, 
such as fines, be added to the HCQIA. 
It might be thought that our argument is undermined by the UW study’s finding that the 
strength of confidentiality laws has no effect on reporting. If secrecy discourages reporting, as 
we argue, would not stronger confidentiality laws actually decrease reporting? However, the 
dual protection afforded to the peer review process by federal and state laws has resulted in a 
level of secrecy that is universally high, regardless of state confidentiality laws. The strength of 
the culture of secrecy is illustrated by the failed PwC study described above.  
iv. The NPDB as a Disclosure-Based Regulatory Scheme 
At its heart, the system for reporting adverse peer review actions is a disclosure-based 
regulatory scheme.117 A Harvard study examined several such disclosure systems: SEC financial 
disclosure, nutrition labeling, reporting of medical mistakes, toxic release disclosure, publication 
of patterns of mortgage lending, and disclosure of unions’ financial information.118
 
The study 
found that successful schemes had three characteristics: “strong . . . intermediaries representing 
information users,” a benefit to information disclosers from good disclosure, and standards that 
allow information to be understood and compared.119 
The NPDB reporting system may not be completely comparable to some other 
disclosure-based systems, but it is still instructive to consider to what extent the current NPDB 
system exhibits the characteristics of a successful disclosure-based regulatory system. We 
contend that the current NPDB system falls short on all three counts. Under the current system, 
there is insufficient benefit to hospitals from full disclosure because there is little prospect that a 
hospital failing to make full disclosure will be penalized. Also under the current system, there are 
                                                          
113 See generally Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 39–47. 
114 See id. at 43. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 44. 
117 See generally Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies 
Sustainable? (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
RWP03-039, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=384922. 
118 See id. at 6. 
119 See id. at 38–40.  
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no strong intermediaries benefiting information users. The hospital controls the process, which is 
secretive. 
As to the comparability of information, it is ostensibly standardized: a hospital that 
queries the database can tell whether a doctor has had his clinical privileges revoked, suspended 
for sixty days, and so on.120 Yet, because the current system of peer review is so prone to error, 
as argued above, the information is not truly comparable. Some disciplined doctors have shown 
serious incompetence, while others have been the victims of “sham peer review.”121 The penalty 
is comparable, but the quality of the peer review process itself is not comparable due to the 
federal and state protections of the process. 
In enacting the HCQIA, Congress was far more concerned with reducing improper 
leniency than with reducing improper severity. The immunity in the HCQIA, and in parallel state 
statutes, allows peer review bodies to impose discipline without much fear of litigation, even 
though this immunity makes it easier to conduct sham peer review. The NPDB system spreads 
reports of discipline nationwide, even though this reporting system magnifies the effect of sham 
peer review and may drive good doctors out of the profession. 
The Congressional emphasis on reducing improper leniency is evident in the 
Congressional findings set forth in the HCQIA.122
 
Given this predominant concern with reducing 
improper leniency, it might be thought—or it might once have been thought—that increasing 
improper severity was a necessary price worth paying. Experience has shown, however, that the 
dual federal-state system of peer review protections has not resulted in a trade-off in which 
improper leniency was reduced at the cost of increasing improper severity. Rather, as we have 
shown, the system tends to increase both kinds of errors: improper leniency as well as improper 
severity. 
We earlier listed the three assumptions underlying the practice of traditional disciplinary 
peer review, according to Moore et al.123 The third assumption is that “peer review participants are 
motivated to maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.”124 
Experience has shown that this assumption, in particular, is naive. Doubtless peer reviewers often 
have noble motivations and often act in good faith, but they also often have self-interested 
motivations disposing them toward improper severity or improper leniency: motivations that are 
magnified, rather than inhibited, by the current regulatory scheme.  
IV. OPENING UP THE SYSTEM 
Our proposed solution to the problems of hospital peer review is to open up the system: 
to eliminate completely all immunity, privilege, and confidentiality under federal and state law. 
We realize how radical this proposal is.125
 
It is an idealized vision, not a proposal that we 
necessarily expect to be adopted any time in the near future. 
                                                          
120 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NPDB GUIDEBOOK, at E-1 to -5, 
E-30 to -31 (2015), available at http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbguidebook.pdf/. 
121 See Koepke, supra note 10, at 10–13. 
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012). 
123 See supra Part I. 
124 Moore et al., supra note 16, at 1177. 
125 Which is not to say it is completely original. See, e.g., Koepke, supra note 10 (focusing mainly on the problem of 
sham peer review); van Geertruyden, supra note 10. 
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The elimination of privilege, immunity and confidentiality would mean that hospitals 
(and peer reviewers, internal and external) could be sued by doctors alleging sham peer review. 
Hospitals could be sued by patients who allege negligence in credentialing and in allowing 
doctors to retain clinical privileges. Medical malpractice plaintiffs having a claim against a 
doctor could monitor any disciplinary peer review of the doctor’s behavior and could use 
information thus obtained in their cases.126
 
Instead of being insulated from liability on all sides, 
the peer review process would be open to challenge from all interested parties and open to 
examination by those parties. Opening up the process in this way should reduce both kinds of 
errors to which the current system is subject: improper severity and improper leniency. 
Scheutzow would remove immunity on one side of the process, but not on the other.127 
She urges states to allow negligent credentialing suits and Congress to “take steps to ensure that 
the [HCQIA] cannot be interpreted to provide immunity for negligent credentialing matters.”128
 
But having protected the right to sue for negligent credentialing, Scheutzow would retain 
“immunity from lawsuits brought by those physicians adversely affected by the process.”129 
We disagree: all immunities related to the peer review process must be eliminated. If 
hospitals are subject to liability for improper leniency (through negligent credentialing suits) but 
not for improper severity, their incentives will be tilted even more strongly toward improper 
severity. Opening up the process to claims from both doctors and injured patients will encourage 
peer review decisions that are properly balanced and correct: neither improperly lenient nor 
improperly severe.  
A.  Peer Review Not Discouraged 
We now examine in detail the likely effects of our radical proposal and respond to a 
number of objections. An obvious objection is that opening up the system will discourage peer 
review. This objection must be clarified, however: discourage peer review in place of what? 
There are two basic ways in which hospitals might reduce the practice of peer review, and each 
requires a somewhat different analysis. First, hospitals could forego any discipline of doctors, 
allowing them to retain clinical privileges even in the face of clear misconduct. Second, hospitals 
could deprive doctors of clinical privileges, but without conducting peer review. 
The unduly permissive practice of allowing doctors to retain privileges without going 
through peer review, even after they endanger patient health, is one that exists now for doctors 
who receive favoritism from their hospitals and colleagues.130
 
This permissiveness will most 
likely decrease once the system is opened up. Injured patients will demand peer review and will 
be able to verify whether it is taking place. Hospitals will face the possibility that, if they 
improperly fail to conduct peer review, future patients who are injured by a doctor will sue the 
hospital for negligently allowing the doctor to remain credentialed. 
True, the hospital will also lose its immunity to suits by doctors who claim they have 
been wrongly deprived of their clinical privileges. But the balance of incentives should still lead 
hospitals to conduct peer review when it is warranted. The prospect of a strong negligent 
credentialing suit by a future patient, with its attendant negative publicity, should outweigh the 
                                                          
126 Though the evidence may be barred by Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or state analogues as a 
“subsequent remedial measure.” See Fox v. Kramer, 994 P.2d 343, 351–53 (Cal. 2000). 
127 See Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 56. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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prospect of a weak suit by a doctor who really does deserve to lose his privileges. Conversely, if 
peer review is not warranted, or discipline after peer review is not warranted, the balance of 
incentives in an open system should lead hospitals not to deprive doctors of their clinical 
privileges: the prospect of a strong suit by the doctor (no longer barred by immunity) should 
outweigh the prospect of a weak negligent credentialing suit by a future patient. 
The other way in which hospitals might reduce the practice of peer review under an open 
system is by depriving doctors of clinical privileges without peer review. This also happens 
under the current system, and results in underreporting to the NPDB.131 
Hospitals can coerce doctors into surrendering their privileges under threat of sham peer 
review, then fail to report this action to the NPDB, even though by law such a surrender of 
privileges under threat of peer review must be reported.132  
Once again, however, such practices would be less likely under an open system. Without 
the immunity that often protects sham peer review, doctors will not be so easily cowed into 
surrendering their privileges; they will demand peer review. In short, we are not convinced by 
the objection that an open system will lead hospitals to reduce the use of peer review, either by 
allowing doctors to retain privileges without going through peer review or by depriving them of 
privileges without peer review.  
B.  Increased Use of External Reviewers 
Most peer review proceedings involve internal review: the physician is judged by 
colleagues who are affiliated with the same hospital.133
 
As argued above, conflicts of interest are 
inherent in such a process. The use of external reviewers would greatly alleviate these 
conflicts.134 
Opening up the system as we propose would encourage hospitals to use external 
reviewers in the peer review process. If a hospital is sued because of its peer review results, 
whether by a doctor or a patient, its defense will be significantly more credible if it can show that 
it followed the decision of external reviewers. Following the decision of external reviewers 
would certainly tend to negate the inference of improper bias, either for or against the doctor 
being reviewed. Once the peer review system loses its shield of immunity, hospitals will more 
often decide that they need the greater credibility of external review. 
An increased use of external reviewers would likely improve the quality of peer review 
not only because of the avoidance of bias, but because external reviewers will be compensated at 
market rates. Internal peer reviewers are generally uncompensated; peer review is a duty they 
must fulfill in order to maintain staff privilege at the hospital.135 Of course, a process in which 
individuals are compelled to donate their time is likely to be short-changed on time and effort. 
Ironically, many physicians who act as internal reviewers without compensation are able 
to earn hundreds of dollars per hour for performing a similar function: providing reviews as 
                                                          
131 See, e.g., LEVINE & WOLFE, supra note 36, at 16; Baldwin et al., supra note 96, at 351; Waters et al., supra note 
20, at 37; discussion supra Part II.B.2.c. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
133 See Edwards & Benjamin, supra note 15, at 462. 
134 External reviewers should be required to make a formal declaration of any potential conflict of interest. 
Presumably, hospitals would avoid using conflicted external reviewers. 
135 Robert Marder, Peer Review Monthly: Why is Peer Review Hard to Do?, HCPRO (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://www.hcpro.com/MSL-221119-871/Peer-Review-Monthly-Why-is-peer-review-hard-to-do.html.   
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expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases.136 Quality of care would be served by spending 
some of this money up front while the case is being reviewed in a medical context—before it 
gets to a courtroom. 
Hopefully, the removal of immunity, privilege, and confidentiality would lead eventually 
to the creation of a cadre of professional, compensated, and specifically trained and credentialed 
peer reviewers. If there were an accrediting organization for peer reviewers, it would probably be 
best for that organization to select the external reviewers for each case, rather than leaving that 
function in the hands of the hospital. External selection of the external reviewers would further 
minimize the ability of hospitals to manipulate the results of the review process.137  
C.  Effect on Internal Reviewers 
A major justification given for peer review immunity in the existing system is that 
internal reviewers would not participate if they risked getting sued.138 Opening up the system, as 
we propose, would admittedly discourage internal reviewers from participating. That, however, 
is not a telling objection to our proposal; rather, it is an advantage. Our proposal would move 
toward a system in which the external reviewer is more common and the internal reviewer is 
rarer; we would not be disappointed if the internal reviewer disappeared entirely. 
Nevertheless, even if all our proposals were adopted, hospitals would likely still continue 
to use at least some internal reviewers; after all, internal reviewers were used before all the 
immunities and other peer review protections that now exist were written into federal and state 
law. Hospitals would likely address the internal reviewers’ fear of liability by providing them 
with insurance from an insurance company or by having the hospital itself agree to defend and 
indemnify them against resulting litigation. Even with insurance, the removal of immunity 
should have a salutary effect on the way internal reviewers perform their function, giving them 
greater incentives to avoid both improper severity and improper leniency.  
D.  Effect on NPDB Underreporting 
Opening up the peer review system would likely reduce NPDB underreporting to a 
considerable degree. With peer review proceedings public, it will be much harder to hide adverse 
actions that should be reported to the NPDB.139 Hospitals will be wary of evading NPDB 
reporting by imposing too minimal sanctions (such as educational requirements or a suspension 
of less than thirty days), for fear of provoking negligent credentialing suits. And we have already 
noted that hospitals will be less able to coerce doctors to surrender their privileges by threatening 
peer review; if the doctor believes he deserves to retain his clinical privileges, he will be more 
likely to have faith in the peer review process and to demand that the process be followed. 
But we have an additional proposal that should promote accurate NPDB reporting to an 
even greater extent. If there is a failure in NPDB reporting at one hospital that leads to a doctor 
gaining clinical privileges at a second hospital and then injuring a patient through malpractice, 
                                                          
136 Id.; see generally Expert Witness Fee Study, SEAK, INC., http://www.seak.com/Expert_Witness_Fees.html (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
137 Professor Kinney has suggested that Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) provide external reviewers. See 
Kinney, supra note 79, at 84–85. “QIOs are physician-dominated organizations [that] conduct reviews of the quality 
of medical care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.” Id. at 84. However, we believe that these organizations, as part 
of the Medicare system, are too focused on issues of cost to reliably fill the role of selecting external reviewers. 
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (2012). 
139 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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the injured patient should have a cause of action against the first hospital as well as any other 
appropriate defendants. Enforcing the NPDB reporting obligations through a private right of 
action should magnify the incentive of hospitals to comply fully with those obligations. 
As we earlier observed, the NPDB system can be seen as a disclosure-based regulatory 
system.140 Research has shown that such a regulatory system, if successful, has three 
characteristics: strong intermediaries representing information users, a benefit to information 
disclosers from good disclosure, and standards that allow information to be understood and 
compared. The current peer review system does not display these characteristics, but our 
proposals would go far to remedy its defects. 
To repeat, under the current system, there is insufficient benefit to hospitals from full 
disclosure because there is little prospect that a hospital failing to make full disclosure will be 
penalized. Also under the current system, there are no strong intermediaries benefiting 
information users. The hospital controls the process, which is secret. The penalties reported to 
the NPDB are ostensibly comparable, but the peer review proceedings resulting in those 
penalties are not comparable: no one can tell whether the doctor was justifiably disciplined or 
was the victim of a sham peer review. 
Under our proposed reforms, by contrast, the NPDB reporting system would have the 
characteristics of a successful disclosure-based regulatory scheme. Hospitals would have greater 
incentive to comply fully with their NPDB reporting obligations because it would be much 
harder for them to conceal actions that they are obliged to report. As noted above, in addition to 
opening up the peer review system, we support making additional sanctions available for non-
reporting, such as civil fines,
 
and we support the creation of a new private right of action against 
hospitals that violate their NPDB reporting obligations. These reforms would give hospitals even 
greater incentives to comply with their NPDB reporting obligations. 
An open peer review system would have a variety of strong intermediaries promoting full 
NPDB reporting. These would include external reviewers, who would not want to be associated 
with deficient peer review systems, and medical malpractice plaintiffs and their attorneys, who 
would focus public attention on allegations of serious medical incompetence being heard by the 
peer review system. If our proposal for a private right of action against hospitals violating their 
NPDB reporting obligations were adopted, additional strong intermediaries promoting disclosure 
would be added. 
An open and public peer review system would also produce results that are comparable. 
The methodology and format of the most credible reviews would be expected to become 
standard. 
There has always been something paradoxical about the attempt to create a transparent 
and public database of physician discipline by channeling into it reports from an impenetrably 
secret and virtually unchallengeable closed peer review system. There is certainly no guarantee 
that an open system will improve NPDB reporting, but that result seems very likely to us.  
E.  Problems of Cost 
Our proposals would add a number of visible costs to the peer review system. At least 
initially, litigation that is now barred or discouraged by peer review protections would likely 
increase. More doctors would challenge the results of an adverse peer review, more patients 
would sue hospitals for negligent credentialing, and more patients would bring malpractice cases 
based on information obtained from a public peer review process. 
                                                          
140 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.d. 
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The peer review process itself would also become more expensive for hospitals. They 
would substantially increase the number of external reviewers they use, and each external 
reviewer would probably receive a higher fee, reflecting the increased risk of being sued and the 
increased cost of insurance to the external reviewer. The cost of insuring and/or indemnifying 
internal reviewers would also rise, and hospitals might even find themselves compensating 
internal reviewers for their time. Arguably, all of these additional costs of an open peer review 
system could cause some rise in the cost of health care. 
Despite the increased visible costs of an open system, we contend that improving the 
results of peer review, through our proposals, would improve the quality of care and would 
reduce social costs overall. “Sham” peer review would no longer drive good doctors out of the 
profession at great social cost. Nor would “sham” peer review deter legitimate criticism and 
“whistleblowing” by doctors, as it does now. Bad practices and bad doctors would be caught 
more quickly in an open system that is subject to challenge by all interested parties, reducing 
great damage that would otherwise be done. In short, liability exposure to all interested parties 
would cause the quality of care to improve. With improved quality, the malpractice costs of 
hospitals and doctors could actually decline over time. 
Even in the short term, opening up the peer review system to challenge from all sides 
may not produce a litigation explosion. The immediate improvement in the peer review process, 
due to increased use of external reviewers and loss of immunity, should limit the number of 
cases brought by doctors alleging “sham” or bad-faith peer review. As to malpractice cases, 
when peer review finds a culpable error, plaintiffs will certainly be eager to use that ammunition 
in their court cases. Often, however, peer review will not find that the doctor is at fault. In such 
cases, the enhanced credibility of the peer review process may discourage litigants from bringing 
a malpractice case. 
Moreover, a significant percentage of malpractice claims are brought by patients because 
they feel that the hospital or physicians are hiding something.141
 
Although it is conceded that in 
many of these cases facts may actually be hidden, in many other cases they are not. Publicly 
accessible peer review records would go a long way toward reassuring patients and their families 
that they have all the facts.142  
V. CONCLUSION 
The well-intended immunity from civil liability for peer review established by the 
HCQIA, along with state immunity, privilege, and confidentiality, have the paradoxical effect of 
shielding hospital quality improvement processes from outside scrutiny and discouraging 
mandated reporting of adverse actions against hospital physicians. These legal protections should 
be removed. The resulting market forces can be expected to create a more credible and robust 
peer review process that will result in improved hospital quality and reporting. It is both ironic 
and unsettling that the court system—with its use of discovery available to all parties, and 
compensated medical experts that practice in the same field as the care provider—creates a more 
                                                          
141 See, e.g., Kathleen Shostek & Christine Clark, Communication Plays Key Role in OB Patient Expectations, J. 
HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., Autumn (Fall) 2008, at 29, 29; Richard A. Spector, Plaintiff’s Attorneys Share 
Perspectives on Patient Communication, 29 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., no. 3, 2010, at 29, 30. 
142 One study has shown that lawsuits and legal costs decrease when disclosure programs are implemented. See 
Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error Disclosure 
Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 217 (2010) (finding that disclosure-and-offer program reduced 
frequency of lawsuits and liability costs at the University of Michigan Health System). 
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credible peer review product than the health care industry. We contend that it would be better for 
this level of effort to occur first as a hospital activity rather in the courts. Repeal of peer review 
immunity, privilege, and confidentiality is a large and necessary first step.
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Summary of State Peer Review Protections 
 
State Immunity Privilege Confidentiality Comments 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 34-24-58 (2013); 
see also ALA. CODE § 6 
6-5-333(A) (2013). 
ALA. CODE § 34-24-60 (2013); 
see also ALA. CODE §  
6-5-333(D) (2013). 
See Privilege.  
Alaska ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§  
18.23.010, 18.23.020 (West 
2013). 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §  
18.23.030 (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36- 
445.02 (2013). 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36- 
445.01 (2013). 
See Privilege.  
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-502 
(West 2013). 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9- 
503(a) (West 2013). 
None.  
California None. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 
(West 2013). 
None. California opted out of the peer review 
provisions of the HCQIA but not the 
reporting requirements to the NPDB. CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE §  
809 (West 2013). 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 12-
36.5-105 (West 2013); see also 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3-
109(6) (West 2013). 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 25-3-
109(4) (West 2013). 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §  
25-3-109(1) (West 2013). 
“[I]mplementation of quality management 
functions to evaluate and improve patient 
and resident care is essential . . . [so it] is 
necessary that the collection of information 
and data by such licensed or certified health 
care facilities be reasonably unfettered. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §  
25-3-109 (West 2013). 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §  
19a-17b(b) (West 2013). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a- 
117b(d) (West 2013). 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §  
19a-17c (West 2013). 
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Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §  
1768(A) (West 2013). 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §  
1768(B) (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Washington, D.C. D.C. CODE § 44-803 
(2013). 
D.C. CODE § 44-805 
(2013). 
See Privilege.  
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0193(5) 
(West 2013). 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0193(8) 
(West 2013). 
None.  
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-132 (West 
2013). 
GA. CODE ANN.. § 31-7-133 (West 
2013). 
See Privilege.  
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §6331.7 (2013). HAW. REV. STAT. §624-25.5 
(2013). 
See Privilege.  
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 39-1392c 
(West 2013). 
IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b (West 
2013). 
See Privilege.  
Illinois 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/5 
(2013). 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 
(2013); see also 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/8-2102 (2013). 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2101 
(2013). 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-2105 (2013). 
(Improper disclosure is a misdemeanor) 
Indiana IND. CODE §§ 34-30-15- 
15–20 (2013). 
IND. CODE § 34-30-15-1 (2013). IND. CODE § 34-30-15-8 
(2013). 
 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 147.135(1) 
(2013). 
IOWA CODE § 147.135 (2) (2013). See Privilege.  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-4909 
(2013). 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-4915(B) 
(2013). 
See Privilege. Such goals may be achieved by requiring a 
system which combines a reasonable means 
to monitor the quality of health care with 
the provision of a reasonable means to 
compensate patients for the risks related to 
receiving health care rendered by 
healthcare providers licensed by the state of 
Kansas. Kan. Stat. Ann. §65-4914 (West). 
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Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 311.377(1) (2013). 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
311.377(2) (2013). 
See Privilege. Instead of offering immunity to the 
reviewers, the statute instead says that 
anyone who applies for/is granted 
privileges waives any claim to damages that 
may result from peer review. 
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 13:3715.3(B)–(C) (2013). 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13:3715.3(A) (2013). 
See Privilege.  
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,  
§ 2511 (West 2013); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 32, § 3293 (West 2013). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 
2599 (West 2013). 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 
§§ 
2510, 2510-A (West 
2013). 
 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 
1-401(f) (West 2013). 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. 
§ 1-4001(d) (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
231, § 85N (West 2013). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
111, § 204 (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
331.351 (West 2013). 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§331.533 (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Minnesota MINN. STAT. §§ 145.62–63 
(2013). 
MINN. STAT. § 145.64(1) 
(2013). 
See Privilege. Penalty for disclosure is a misdemeanor. 
MINN. STAT. § 145.66 (2013). 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-5 
(West 2013). 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 
(West 2013). 
See Privilege. “[E]xpressed legislative purpose of 
promoting quality patient care through 
medical and dental peer review activities.” 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 
41-63-9 (West 2013). 
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. § 537.035 
(3) (2013). 
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.035 
(4) (2013). 
None.  
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Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2- 
201(1) (2013). 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2- 
201(2) (2013). 
None.  
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §71-7911 
(2013). 
NEB. REV. STAT. §71-7912 
(2013). 
See Privilege. Nebraska changed its peer review laws in 
2011. The new statute is more restrictive in 
that the grant of confidentiality and 
privilege of the peer review records is 
absolute. By comparison, the old statute 
allowed for the veil of privilege to be 
pierced if the patient waived confidentiality 
Nevada None. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.265 
(2013). 
None.  
New Hampshire None. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
151:13-a (2013). 
See Privilege.  
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A- 
22.10 (West 2013). 
None. None.  
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-9-3–4 
(West 2013). 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-9-5 
(West 2013). 
See Privilege. Unauthorized disclosure is a “petty 
misdemeanor and shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not to exceed six months 
or by a fine of not more than one hundred 
dollars ($100), or both.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
41-9-6 (West 2013). 
New York N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 
2805-m (3) (McKinney 
2013). 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 
2805-m(2) (McKinney 
2013). 




North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
131E-95(a) (West 2013). 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
131E-95(b) (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
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North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34- 
06 (West 2013). 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-03 
(West 2013). 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23- 
34-02 (West 2013). 
 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2305.251 (West 2013). 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2305.252 (West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 
25–26 (West 2013). 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1- 
1709.1 (West 2013). 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 




Oregon None. OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055 
(West 2013) (all data is privileged 
pursuant to OR. REV. STAT. § 
41.675 (West 
2013)). 
OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055 
(West 2013) (pursuant to OR. 
REV. STAT. 
§§192.501–192.505, 
192.690 (West 2013)). 
 
Pennsylvania 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 425.3 (West 
2013). 
63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 425.4 (West 
2013). 
See Privilege.  
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-25 
(West 2013); see also R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (West 
2013). 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-25 
(West 2013). 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3- 
7 (West 2013). 
Disclosure of confidential penalties subject 
to civil and criminal (misdemeanor) 
liability. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-9 (West 
2013). 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-70-10 
(2013). 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 
(2013). 
See Privilege.  
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4- 
25 (2013). 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4- 
26.1 (2013). 
See Privilege.  
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Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11- 
272(d) (West 2013). 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11- 
272(c) (West 2013). 
See Privilege. “It is the policy of this state to encourage 
the improvement of patient safety, the 
quality of patient care and the evaluation of 
the quality, safety, cost, processes and 
necessity of healthcare services by 
hospitals, healthcare facilities and 
healthcare providers. Tennessee further 
recognizes that certain protections must be 
available to these entities to ensure that they 
are able to effectively pursue these 
measures. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-272 
(West 2013). 
Texas TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 
160.010 (West 2013). 
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 
160.006; 160.007 (West 
2013). 
See Privilege.  
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13-5 
(West 2013). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-3 
(West 2013). 
None.  
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1442 
(West 2013). 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1443 
(West 2013). 
See Privilege.  
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01- 
581.16 (West 2013). 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01- 
581.17 (West 2013). 
None.  
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
4.24.250 (West 2013). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
4.24.250, 70.41.200 (West 
2013). 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
70.56.050 (West 2013). 
 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-2 
(2013). 
W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 
(2013). 
See Privilege.  
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §146.37 
(2013). 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §146.38 
(2013). 
None  
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-17- 
103 (West 2013); see also id.  
§ 33-26-408. 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-17-105 
(West 2013); see also id. § 
33-26-408. 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-26- 
408 (West 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
